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THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
AND ETHNIC DIVISION
by Stephen Ellmann*
I. INTRODUCTION

In an era of ethnic slaughter in countries from Bosnia to
Rwanda, the peril of ethnic division cannot be ignored. Reducing that
peril by constitutional means is no simple task, for when ethnic groups
pull in different directions a free country can only produce harmony
between them by persuading each to honor some claims of the other
and to moderate some claims of its own. It will require much more
than technical ingenuity in constitution-writing to generate such
mutual forbearance. Moreover, constitutional provisions that promote
this goal will inevitably do so at a price - namely, the reduction of
any single group's ability to work its will through the political process.
And that price is likely to be most painful to pay when it entails
restraining a group's ability to achieve goals that are just - for
example, when it limits the ability of the victims of South African
apartheid to redress the profound injustice they have suffered.
This Article examines the efforts of the drafters of the new
transitional South African Constitution to overcome ethnic division, or
alternatively to accommodate it. We will see from this analysis that
the complex arrangements established by the transitional constitution
do entail constraints on the power of South Africa's newly enfranchised
black majority. Nonetheless, I will argue that these provisions, in
general, represent a wise response to the tremendous challenges
involved in making a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy.
At least some of these constraints on majority power might be
neither necessary nor desirable if ethnic division were not a reality of
South African life, and so it is important to begin by recognizing this
reality. It is important as well to try to gauge its severity. Those who

Professor of Law, New York Law School. I appreciate the helpful comments of
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Geoff Budlender, Richard Briffault, Matthew Chaskalson, Dana Gershon, Jonathan
Klaaren, Bongani Majola, Etienne Mureinik, Thandabantu Nhlapo, and Nancy
Rosenbloom, as well as the financial support of New York Law School. Earlier versions
of this paper were presented in 1994 at the Conference on Rights in New Constitutions,
sponsored by the Center for the Study of Human Rights and the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review, and at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. Some
passages of this paper are drawn, with permission, from my analyses of the new South
African Constitution published in the February 14, 1994, and May 3, 1994, editions of
South Africa: The Countdown to Elections (a newsletter of the Southern Africa Project
of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
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shape South Africa's constitutional response to ethnic division must
struggle to distinguish implacable and deep-seated ethnic hostility
from the potentially curable effects of individual demagogic leaders.
They must also try to distinguish between the fears of many South
Africans about their future in a country where their groups do not
enjoy majority status, and the likely realities of different ethnic groups
under a new constitutional order.
It hardly requires argument that one form of ethnic tension
exists in South Africa, namely the longstanding white prejudice
against blacks. Perhaps it is now similarly clear that black hostility
towards whites exists, though the weak showing of the Pan Africanist
Congress in the country's recent, flawed, but wonderful election 1
suggests that such feelings are hardly dominant in black political
sentiment in South Africa.2 It may be more controversial to assert that
ethnic tensions exist between different groups of blacks.3 Yet Coloured
alienation from Africans seems to have played a significant part in the
victory of the National Party (not long ago the architects of apartheid)
in the provincial elections in the Western Cape;4 there have also been

1.
The April 1994 election, the first nonracial election ever held in South Africa,
was for many South Africans an event to celebrate. The long lines of patient voters
waiting to exercise their franchise were an inspiring example of democracy in action, all
the more miraculous because of the threats of violence which had been so widespread
until just a few days before the election. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, the results in one province of South Africa, KwaZulu/Natal, were tainted
by massive fraud. See infra note 7.
2.
The Pan Africanist Congress, long notorious for its "one settler, one bullet"
slogan, placed sixth in the election, in which it won only 1.2% of the vote and just five
seats in the National Assembly. Final Returns From South Africa, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1994, at A8. The five parties which fared better were the African National Congress
(62.7% of the vote and 252 seats), the National Party (20.4% of the vote and 82 seats),
the Inkatha Freedom Party (10.5% of the vote and 43 seats), the Freedom Front (2.2%
of the vote and 9 seats), and the Democratic Party (1.7% of the votes and 7 seats). Id.
3.
I follow the practice of many South Africans in using the term "black" to refer
to all South Africans of African, mixed-race ("Coloured," in South African parlance), and
Indian descent.
4.
See Jonathan Steele, De Klerk Unlocks New Hope in Cape, Guardian (London),
May 6, 1994, at 14; Jonathan Steele, ANC Yields Western Cape to Nationalists,Guardian
(London), May 4, 1994, at 11. At least some Coloured South Africans are angry enough
with the new South African government that they rioted on September 15, 1994. See Bill
Keller, Mixed-Race South Africans Riot Over 'Favoritism'for Blacks, N.Y. Times, Sept.
16, 1994, at A9.
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suggestions of tension between Indians and Africans;' and finally,
there are clearly ethnic tensions between different groups of Africans.
One of these divisions is between the Zulu and the Xhosa, the
two largest African ethnic groups in South Africa. 6 I certainly do not
mean to suggest that all Zulu support the Inkatha Freedom Party
(Inkatha) or are moved by the ethnic, traditionalist appeals made by
Inkatha and its leader, Chief Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi. Perhaps, in
truth, less than a majority are pro-Inkatha, though the election in
Natal was so traumatized by fraud that it is hard to say for sure either
way.7 Certainly many Zulu support the African National Congress
(ANC), to which Inkatha is fiercely opposed.' But opinion polls cited
by Donald Horowitz suggest that Africans of different ethnic groups

5.
Most Indians (and most "Coloureds"), it appears, voted for the National Party.
Patti Waldmeir & Michael Holman, South African Elections: Spirit of Conciliation
Sweeps Aside Letter of Vote, Fin. Times (London), May 7, 1994, at 3. See also Kenneth
B. Noble, South Africa's Indians Shift Loyalties, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1994, at As.
6.
As of 1986, there were approximately 6.5 million Zulu (27% of the African
population) and 5.5 million Xhosa (23% of the African population). Seven other groups
- Tswana, Pedi (North Sotho), Sotho (South Sotho), Tsonga (Shangaan), Swazi, Venda,
and Ndebele - made up the remainder of the country's African population. Donald L.
Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society
48-49 (1991).
7.
Although the chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission certified the
South African election in Natal, as elsewhere in the country, as "substantially free and
fair," John Carlin, ANC Wins Seven out of Nine Provinces to Complete Landslide,
Independent (London), May 7, 1994, at 12, there were widespread reports of massive
election fraud in the province. According to one report, "hundreds of ballot boxes came
[for counting] neatly stacked with perfectly folded ballots, almost all marked for
Inkatha." Many districts produced more votes, in one case over eight times more votes,
than had been projected. Some estimates were that more than one-fourth of the four
million votes counted in Natal were tainted. Dele Olojede, ANC Ignored Fraud; Inkatha
'Victory'AppearsRigged, Newsday (Nassau and Suffolk ed.), May 17, 1994, at A4. The
African National Congress (ANC) could have chosen to object to these events much more
forcefully, but that course of action ran the risk of calling the entire election into
question and thus undercutting the legitimacy of Nelson Mandela's accession to the
Presidency. (The ANC also may have been guilty of fraud.) More chillingly, ANC
resistance to recognition of the Natal results might have refueled the terrible violence
of previous months. See id. (quoting an Inkatha leader as saying that "[i]f they [the ANCI
are serious about stopping violence, they must stop this nonsense about irregularities").
Thus, while the official election returns gave Inkatha 50.3% of the vote in Natal, against
the ANC's 32.2%, it remains quite possible that a majority of the Zulu (the predominant
black ethnic group in Natal) actually oppose Inkatha. See Carln,supra. For the view
that fraud did not fundamentally distort the results, however, see Rian Malan, Party
Time: Finally Out of the Darkness, Guardian (London), May 13, 1994, § 2, at 13.
8.
See Carlin,supra note 7, at 12.

8

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.26:5

sometimes hold views of each other's groups that are so hostile that,
if we encountered them in whites' attitudes towards blacks, we would
not hesitate to describe them as prejudiced. 9 In one startling study,
Zulu expressed a variety of negative views of Ndebele, Tsonga and
especially Xhosa people. ' Much of the recent political violence among
blacks has been linked to the hostility between Zulu and Xhosa.
But South Africa has seen incidents of violence between other
African groups as well." Given the appalling example of Bosnia,
where groups that had lived together peacefully for many decades and
substantially intermarried descended in a few years to criminal or
even genocidal war, 2 it would be a mistake to assume that even the

9.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 61-71. For example, Horowitz points to "[tihe
frequent finding that Africans of various groups believe at least some Whites to possess
more desirable attributes than those possessed by Black groups other than their own.'
Id. at 70.
10.
In this study, Zulu living in KwaMashu, a township near Durban, expressed
"[flairly elaborate stereotypes" and "[s]trongly negative characterizations" for some other
African groups. "Ndebele were 'backward,' Tsonga were 'loose-living,' and Xhosa were
'clever' people who would make the Zulu feel 'lost' and 'inferior or would cheat them. In
fact, 'Zulu really get their ire up when they refer to the Xhosa,' whom they described as
'too clever,' 'crooks,' 'scheming,' 'very cunning,' 'crafty,' and 'stiflheaded.' IId. at 65-66
(quoting Brian M. du Toit, Ethnicity, Neighborliness, and Friendship among Urban
Africans in South Africa, in Ethnicity in Modern Africa 153, 158 (Brian M. du Toit ed.,
1978)).
11.
Horowitz, supra note 6, at 73 (citing incidents of violence between Shangaan
and Pedi, and between Ndebele and Pedi). Both of these incidents were evidently
provoked by South African government manipulation of the boundaries of the so-called
"homelands," to which it sought to consign Africans, but, as Horowitz also notes, the fact
that ethnic conflict has to some extent been "artificially" created does not mean that it
is not real. Id. at 46-48, 73-74.
12.
One writer has commented that "Yugoslavs before the [civil] war considered
themselves, by and large, to be Yugoslavs first, Serbs, Croats or Muslims second.
Intermarriage was common. By some estimates, one-third of Yugoslav families are
headed by parents of different ethnic origins. Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb were true
melting pots." Michael Meyer, Using Force in Bosnia War Won't Lead to a Vietnam, L.A.
Times, Jan. 10, 1993, at M2. In Rwanda, somewhat similarly, Hutu and Tutsi shared a
common culture and language and had intermarried significantly; it apparently is often
difficult even for Rwandans to say which group a particular person belongs to. A reporter
describing a village where Tutsi had been massacred by Hutu wrote that "[tihe story of
this village is the story of Rwanda: Hutu and Tutsi living together, intermarrying, not
caring or even not knowing who was a Hutu and who a Tutsi." Raymond Bonner, In
Once-Peaceful Village, Roots of Rwanda Violence, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1994, at A8.
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lesser tensions that exist between Africans
other than Xhosa and Zulu
13
are too trivial to be exploited politically.
There is reason to believe, nonetheless, that South Africa's
ethnic tensions can be contained. The sheer holding of the April
election is some evidence of this, since ethnic strife can make elections
inconceivable. The widespread euphoria associated with the election is
further testimony that a shared sense of national liberation can prevail
over a host of possible divisions. Moreover, the ANC's victory brings to
power (constrained power, to be sure) a group notable for its
longstanding opposition to tribalism 4 and for its striking willingness
to respond to the anxieties of whites. 5 (The ANC is also, however, a
group in which Xhosa have played a visible and disproportionate
role. 6) In addition, there is growing evidence that much of the past
years' putatively ethnic violence was not spontaneous ethnic passion
but rather was engineered by agents of apartheid, the often-suspected
"third force." 7 These grim revelations ironically offer reason to hope

13.

For a more optimistic view, though one written before ethnic violence around

the world escalated to its most recent heights, see Allister Sparks, The Mind of South
Africa (1990). Sparks predicted that "[iun a post-apartheid South Africa, whatever power
struggles arise in the black community, the competing political leaders will not be

appealing to tribal power bases but to ideologically defined political bases" - with
Inkatha as the sole exception to this pattern. Id. at 391.
14.
Id. at 390-91.
15.
Thus Nelson Mandela, in his inaugural address, characteristically declared
that "[w]e enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South
Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts,
assured of their inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with
itself and the world." Mandela'sAddress: "Glory and Hope," N.Y. Times, May 11, 1994,
at A8. He also chose to use this occasion to express deep appreciation to F.W. de Klerk,
the outgoing white president whom Mandela had in previous months sometimes bitterly
criticized. Id.
16.
As of mid-1989, "ten [of the twenty African members of the ANC's National
Executive Committee] were Xhosa, five Tswana, four Pedi, and one Zulu. In short, fully
half the black leadership of the ANC was Xhosa-speaking, which means that Xhosa were
overrepresented by a factor of about 2.2. Zulu were dramatically underrepresented, by
a factor of more than 5." Horowitz, supra note 6, at 54. Among others, Nelson Mandela
and Thabo Mbeki (now, respectively, president and executive deputy president of South
Africa) are both Xhosa. Id.
17.
Shortly before the election a judicial commission of inquiry headed by Judge
Richard Goldstone (who has since been appointed to prosecute war crimes in Bosnia)
reported findings implicating high-level police officers in assisting violence by Inkatha.
See Bill Keller, Inquest Finds South Africa PoliceAided Zulus in TerrorCampaign, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 19, 1994, at 1. Both Inkatha and General Basie Smit, the second-highestranking police officer in South Africa and one of those accused in the Goldstone report,
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that in the future such killings will become less common, as those who
engineered so much of it lose their access to the levers of power.18
Despite these grounds for hope, it is still only a few months
since the AWB, an Afrikaner extremist group, attempted to go to battle
in the apartheid "homeland" of Bophuthatswana, 9 and even less time
since fiery talk of civil war in Natal and KwaZulu was
commonplace.20 It is too soon for complacency. Moreover, the men and
women who shaped the transitional constitution that now governs
South Africa
do not appear to have taken the danger of ethnic strife
21
lightly.
denied the charges. Zulu-Based Group Sees a 'Dirty Trick' in Report by Judge, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1994, at A9.
18.
It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that "third force" activity ended with
the April elections. In July 1994, a South African newspaper reported "[f)resh allegations
about a high-ranking South African policeman arming an Inkatha warlord three weeks
after the April elections." Farouk Chothia, New Evidence - But No Action, Weekly Mail
& Guardian (Johannesburg), July 15-21, 1994, at 2. Meanwhile, violence in the
KwaZulu/Natal area appears to be rising again. Patrick Collings, S. Africa to Investigate
Hit Squads, UPI, July 27, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Nationally,
according to the non-governmental Human Rights Commission, "[p]olitical violence has
dropped by two-thirds since the election," but in the first 100 days of Nelson Mandela's
presidency there still were 457 deaths and 592 injuries in "606 incidents of political
violence." Human Rights Commission Assesses First100 Days, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
19.
See Bill Keller, Mixed Signals Fatalfor South African Separatists,N.Y. Times,
Mar. 12, 1994, at 3.
20.
On April 5, 1994, for example, an Inkatha regional secretary told a rally of
20,000 Zulu carrying traditional weapons that" '[i]f our demands cannot be addressed,
then there is no election on the 27th of April .... We will do everything in our power
to destroy any attempt by any state organ used by the A.N.C. to divide the Zulu nation.'
The same words were used in almost every speech [at the rally]." Donatella Lorch, Arms
Ban Is Defied at Rally by Zulu Party, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1994, at A13.
21.
The transitional constitution is, by definition, not the final constitution that
will govern a post-apartheid South Africa. That document is expected to be written by
a Constitutional Assembly (described below). See infra note 36. It seems very likely,
however, that the negotiations which produced the transitional constitution have also
profoundly affected the shape of the final constitution to come. As a legal matter, this is
so because the transitional constitution includes constitutional principles with which the
final constitution must comply. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. As a practical
matter, it is so because the new institutions of the state seem likely to generate their
own protective interest groups. As an intellectual matter, it is so if only because the
present document will inevitably become a star ing point for subsequent debates.
The likely impact of the transitional constitution is particularly striking in
light of the considerable emphasis which the ANC earlier placed on the importance of
empowering a democratically elected constitutional assembly to write a new constitution
for the country. See Jeffrey Herbst, Creatinga New South Africa, Foreign Pol'y, Spring
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In fact, as we will see, this constitution includes a broad range
of provisions meant, at least in part, to limit, channel or even, if
necessary, to suppress ethnic division in South Africa. In particular, we
will find three different categories of constitutional response to ethnic
division: the shaping of the structure of the new government; the
fashioning of constitutional rights; and the provisions for the use of
force. We will also find that in many respects these provisions
represent significant constraints on the ability of the ANC, now the
majority party in the new South African government, to carry out the
kinds of reforms it has long sought and promised. Their adoption thus
reflects very substantial concessions made by the ANC in the course
of negotiations, and it is possible to attack these concessions as too
substantial.
I do not endorse that attack. On the contrary, I believe that in
general the concessions made by the ANC in the transitional
constitution were appropriate. In many respects, these concessions
represent wise limitations on the power of government, provisions as
appropriate in South Africa as in any other country, or reasonable
accommodations of the ethnic tension that is a particular fact of South
African life. If some provisions concede more protection to particular
ethnic groups than can be justified in principle, moreover, we must
remember that the end of apartheid was the product of negotiations
rather than of warfare. This was fortunate indeed for South Africa, but

1994, at 129. To be sure, the ANC did anticipate that negotiations before the
Constitutional Assembly was chosen would produce constitutional principles that would

bind the Constitutional Assembly. See African National Congress Constitutional
Committee, Discussion Document: Constitutional Principles and Structure for a
Democratic South Africa 5-6 (n.d.). Even so, the sheer length and detail of the
transitional constitution, as well as a number of its specific provisions, suggest that the
ANC's negotiators ultimately decided to accept greater constraints on the Constitutional
Assembly's discretion than they had originally advocated.
As influential as the transitional constitution will be, however, those who are
drafting the final constitution may still prove to have considerable room for maneuver.
Cyril Ramaphosa, a lead negotiator for the ANC in the shaping of the transitional
constitution, is now the chairman of the Constitutional Assembly. He has commented
that the negotiating body responsible for the transitional constitution "was too exclusive,
and ... not fully representative of the various views and opinions in our country," and
characterized the "negotiation process experience" in connection with the framing of the
transitional constitution as "important, but not. . . sufficiently important to lead us to
the drafting of the final constitution of our country." Further on Ramta]phosa's
Constitutional Assembly Strategies, International Intelligence Report, Aug. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-US File. Whether a revised "negotiation process"
will generate significantly different outcomes will only become clear over time.
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the price of a negotiated settlement may well have included
concessions of the sort I examine in this article. Not surprisingly, many
of the provisions in question also reflect concessions made by the
government during the negotiations. At the same time, we do not yet
know how well these various constitutional arrangements will work,
and I will seek to delineate the areas of uncertainty in the discussion
that follows. In addition, endorsement of the general approach of the
transitional constitution does not require us to approve all of its
details, and I will identify certain particularly troubling features of the
new arrangements.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
The importance of governmental structure has been a central
theme of American constitutionalism for two centuries,2 2 and a focus
of South African political struggle for a comparable period.' The ANC
battled for many years to achieve a nonracial, unitary state in South
Africa.24 In this unitary state, the abominations of the homelands those pseudo-nations to which the rulers of apartheid sought to attach
the African majority of South Africa's citizenry - would certainly be
abolished, as they now legally have been.25 It appears, moreover, that
American constitutional debates have long revolved around such questions as
22.
the separation of powers within the national government and the division of authority
between the national government and the states. I explored the relevance of some of
these debates for South African constitutional choices in Stephen Ellmann, The
Separationof Powers in a Post-ApartheidSouth Africa, 8 Am. U. J. Intl L. & Policy 455
(1992-93).
South African constitutional history includes a host of "structural" conflicts:
23.
Afrikaner efforts to secede, by physically escaping, from British rule in the early 19th
century; the founding of independent Afrikaner republics and their consolidation into the
British Empire, after the Boer War, as part of the nation of South Africa; the repartition
of South Africa under apartheid into what were envisioned as multiple African states
dotting the landscape of a white-ruled South Africa; and repeated constitutional
restructuring of the government of South Africa itself, culminating in the 1983 creation
of the tricameral Parliament, with one House each for whites, Coloureds, and Indians,
a "reform" that helped bring on the demise of apartheid. See generally David Harrison,
The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective (1985); Joseph Lelyveld, Move
Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White (1985); Sparks, supra note 13.
24.
"The African National Congress envisages a united, democratic, non-racial and
non-sexist South Africa, a unitary State .... "African National Congress Constitutional
Committee, supra note 21, at 7.
Id. at 7-9. The homelands' abolition is effected in the new constitution.
25.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), §§ 1, 230, sched.
7 [hereinafter S. Afr. Const.].
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the ANC contemplated a highly centralized governmental structure in
which the new leaders of the nation would exercise more or less
plenary, albeit democratic, power.26 But there are many ways that a
nation can be structured and still be one nation, and the ANC over
time reconsidered, and gave ground on, a variety of structural issues.
As ultimately adopted, the transitional constitution accommodates the
anxieties of ethnic minorities in South Africa, and in particular the
concerns of conservative whites and traditionalist Zulu. It does so
through five features of the new governmental structure that it
establishes: a quasi-consociational national government; a federal
division of power between the center and the provinces; an
accommodation of the existing civil service and security forces; an
enhancement of minority power on the local level of government; and
the creation of a process for consideration of an Afrikaner homeland or
volkstaat.
A.

Consociationalism

Apartheid was so repugnant in part because it allowed a
minority to rule over the majority. The fight against apartheid could
easily be characterized as a struggle for majority rule. In that light, it
is startling to realize that a central element of the transitional
constitution's effort to accommodate ethnic tension is a departure from
conventional understandings of the meaning of majority rule. This
departure constitutes a partial embrace of consociationalism.
Consociation is a form of government which, so its supporters claim,
enables a sharply divided nation to hold together by protecting each of
the nation's subgroups from encroachment by the others and enlisting
their leaders in a grand, elite coalition that can transcend the
hostilities that divide many of their followers.2 The South African
26.
For a critical appraisal of federalism as a structure for South African
government, by an influential ANC constitutional lawyer, see Albie Sachs, Protecting
Human Rights in a New South Africa 151-53 (1990). See also Herbst, supra note 21, at
129 (describing the ANC's evolution on the federalism question from an original stance
of "outright opposition (because it considered the devolution of powers to be simply a way
of entrenching white rule) to an acknowledgement that delegation of authority to subnational units would be a good idea").
27.
See Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (1985). Lijphart here
defines the "four basic elements of consociational democracy" as: "(1) Executive powersharing among the representatives of all significant groups; (2) A high degree of internal
autonomy for groups that wish to have it; (3) Proportional representation and
proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds; and (4) A minority veto
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Constitution seems to aim towards such
a grand coalition, in the form
2
of a "government of national unity." 8
The institutional form for this coalition is the executive branch.
The transitional constitution provides two paths by which the parties

that lost the election nonetheless are able to wield a share of executive
power. The first is the guarantee of an executive deputy presidency to
any party winning at least one-fifth of the seats in the National
Assembly. 29 As a result of this provision, President Nelson Mandela

and the executive deputy president designated by the ANC, Thabo
Mbeki, were joined in the government by a second executive deputy
president, the white former president of the nation, F.W. de Kierk. The
president and the executive deputy presidents, in turn, are part of the
Cabinet, the ministers of which are selected by proportional
representation. ° The Cabinet, the constitution instructs, "shall
function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensusseeking spirit underlying the concept of a government
of national unity
31
as well as the need for effective government."
Certain aspects of the constitutional provisions for the new
parliament also seem designed in part to enhance the likelihood of a
grand coalition's success. South Africa has adopted a system of
proportional representation for the election of the most powerful house
of Parliament, the National Assembly, and for the provincial
legislatures.3 2 To be sure, proportional representation is in use in a

on the most vital issues." Id. at 6.
28.
This phrase is used repeatedly in the transitional constitution. See S. Afr.
Const., §§ 86(3); 88(2), (5); 89 (1), (2). In addition, the conclusion of the constitution is
entitled "National Unity and Reconciliation." See S. Ar. Const., unnumbered concluding
sec.

29.
Id. § 84(1).
30.
Every party that won 20 seats in the National Assembly (that is, essentially,
at least 5% of the vote) is entitled to representation in the Cabinet in proportion to its
seats in the Assembly. Id. § 88(2).
31.
Id. § 89(2).
32.
See id. sched. 2. As the text implies, the National Assembly is only one of the
two houses of the national parliament. The other chamber, the Senate, is not chosen by
direct popular election at all. See id. § 48; see also infra note 66.
The National Assembly's greater power derives from its role in the legislative
process. Ordinary legislation must normally be approved by both houses, but if one house
votes a bill down, it can still be enacted if it is approved at a joint sitting "by a majority
of the total number of members of both Houses." S. Ar. Const. § 59(2). Since the
National Assembly has 400 members and the Senate only 90, id. §§ 40, 48, & 124(1), 246
members of the National Assembly can enact legislation even over the Senate's
unanimous objection. The National Assembly's powers over taxation and spending are
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number of countries and need not be a part of a consociational system,
but its effect in South Africa may be to buttress the grand coalition.3 3
On paper, at least, the system would enable the political
parties that have joined the Cabinet of the government of national
unity to enact the Cabinet's decisions into law without any resistance.
The members of the National Assembly in theory owe no allegiance to
any particular group of constituents who have the power to vote them
out of office, for South Africans did not vote for individual district
representatives but rather for political parties.' Moreover, the
members of those parties who have taken seats in Parliament and the
provincial legislatures will be subject to expulsion from Parliament if
they are expelled by their parties. 35 In addition, unless the process of
drafting a permanent constitution breaks down,3" there will almost
certainly be no new elections until 1999."7 Until then, the political
parties can work together, each one bringing its reluctant members
along, without having to face the voters. The effect may be to make it
easier for the leaders of these parties to join in a grand coalition.
This is not full consociationalism by a long shot, for despite the
efforts to foster a government of national unity, the constitution by no

even greater. Id. § 60. For circumstances in which Senatorial power over legislation is
enhanced, however, see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
33.
For a description of the partially-proportional system of representation in West
Germany, a country not notably consociationalist, see Lloyd N. Cutler, Modern European
Constitutions and Their Relevance in the American Context, in Reforming American
Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System
(Donald L. Robinson ed., 1985). For an example of an arguably consociationalist nation
employing proportional representation, see Arend Lijphart's discussion of Switzerland,
in Lijphart, supra note 27, at 90-91.
34.
S. Afr. Const. sched. 2. The constitution did provide, however, for 200 of the
400 Assembly seats to be filled from "regional lists" based on the parties' success in the
nine regions or provinces of the country. Id. sched. 2, §§ 2(a), 5.
35. Id. §§ 43(b), 133(1)(b).
36.
The new constitution is to be worked out by the two houses of Parliament,
sitting together as the Constitutional Assembly. Id. § 68(1). The transitional constitution
charges the Constitutional Assembly to complete its work of adopting a new constitution
within two years "as from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under
this Constitution." Id. § 73(1). If the Constitutional Assembly does not succeed in this
task, the constitution provides for deadlock-breaking procedures, one of which is the
holding of new Parliamentary elections. Id. § 73(9).
37.
Id. §§ 38(1), 80(1)(a). The only possible cause for new elections, other than a
breakdown of the constitution-writing process, would be a parliamentary vote of no
confidence in the Cabinet or in the president and the Cabinet - but the chances of this
seem essentially nonexistent. Even with a vote of no confidence, it appears that elections
would not necessarily follow. See id. § 93.
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means guarantees that the new government will operate as a grand
coalition. 8 The executive deputy presidents are entitled only to
consult and not to veto. 9 Similarly, the Cabinet is not obliged to
make decisions by consensus, but only to "give[] consideration to the
consensus-seeking spirit. 4° The constitution embodies a framework
for, and an aspiration towards, national unity, rather than a
requirement of it. It is also decidedly less consociationalist than the
proposals the government had put forward.4 Nonetheless, as a
framework for a government of national unity, it is a consociational
strategy.

38.
In Lijphart's terms, the new South African Constitution provides for a measure
of "executive power-sharing," but does not, in general, offer a binding "minority veto"
even on important issues. See Lijphart, supra note 27. Nor does the constitution broadly
guarantee a "high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it," though
provisions for federalist institutions, for local government, and for consideration of a
volkstaat - all discussed below - do offer some hints of such autonomy. Most notably,
the constitution's provisions bearing on private discrimination ultimately do not insulate
much of what might be some groups' preferred discriminatory life-style from
governmental override. See infra notes 113-122 and accompanying text. In addition, the
constitution does not guarantee "proportional representation" in civil service positions;
ironically, the ANC might well have welcomed this element of consociationalism, but
such a provision would have jeopardized the jobs of many current, white civil servants.
See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
39. See S. Afr. Const. § 82(2).
40. Id. § 89(2).
41. The National Party had proposed a bicameral legislature, in which the second
house would have had the power to block a wide range of legislation. The first house
would have been selected on the basis of proportional representation, while
representation in the second house would have been based on regions. So far, this
description matches the system South Africa has actually adopted. But in the National
Party's proposal, representation in the second house would have been skewed far away
from democratic proportionality by a rule that every party winning more than a to-bespecified percentage of the region's vote would receive an equal number of seats in the
region's delegation. Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy: The National
Party's Framework for a New Democratic South Africa 11-12 (Sept. 4, 1991) [hereinafter
National Party Framework]. The National Party also proposed that the executive branch
be headed not by a single president but by a presidency, "consisting] of the leaders of
the three largest parties in the First House" (assuming those three parties made up a
majority). The National Party proposed that the chairmanship of this presidency could
rotate on an annual basis, and that a "State President" could "be elected on a rotating
basis from the ranks of the Presidency." Decisions would be made "by consensus." Id. at
13. While much of this may have fallen away at earlier stages of the negotiations,
President de Klerk reportedly sought a rule requiring major Cabinet decisions to be
made by a two-thirds majority almost to the last minute. See Bill Keller, South African
PartiesEndorse Constitution Granting Rights to All, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al,
A14.
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This new government is now in place. Whether it can attain
the unity which the constitution urges it to seek remains to be seen,
but so far it seems to have had considerable success in maintaining a
degree of harmony and consensus.4 2 Nelson Mandela, appraising his
first 100 days in office, recently said that in the government:
We don't paper over difficulties, over differences, but we are
concentrating on those issues which unite us, and there is
scope for all the leaders, and I think that they are playing
their role very well. There is scope to concentrate on those
issues that unite us, and I think that is the essence, the
achievement of the Government of National Unity. We have
made progress because the calibre of the leaders in the
Government of
National Unity are able to see those issues
43

that unite

US.

42.
One instance of this harmony was the recent decision to replace Derek Keys,
a prominent and well-regarded member of the National Party who served as finance
minister in the Mandela Cabinet, with Chris Liebenberg, after the former announced his
plans to resign. Liebenberg was neither a member of Parliament nor a member of the
National Party's (or any other party's) election list of candidates for Parliament. Since
the transitional constitution requires that ministers come from Parliament, and since
resigning members of Parliament - such as Keys - are to be replaced by people on the
election list of the party to which the resigning member belonged, Liebenberg could not
be appointed to Parliament or to the Cabinet according to the transitional constitution.
See S. Afr. Const. §§ 44, 51(2), 88(4). In addition, Liebenberg's appointment to the
Cabinet would deprive the National Party of one of its share of the Cabinet seats, and
the only way to restore the National Party's share without firing some other minister
would be to add a minister to the Cabinet. However, the Cabinet was already at its
constitutionally-specified maximum size of 27 ministers. See id. § 88(1). All of these
problems were to be resolved through the adoption of amendments to the constitution,
evidently with the approval of both the ANC and the National Party. Chris Louw,
Making Up the Rules as They Go Along, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July
8-14, 1994, at 2. The necessary amendment was passed by Parliament on a vote of 343
to 3, on September 15, 1994, and Liebenberg has been appointed. South African Press
Association, ParliamentPasses Bill Allowing for Appointment of FinanceMinister, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File; Xinhua News Agency, South Africa'sNew FinanceMinisteron Economic,
FinancialPolicies, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
43. Mandela Gives Interview on First 100 Days, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 20, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter
Mandela Interview]. Later in this same interview, Mandela commented that he would
like to bring into the government even those parties that did not make the five percent
cut-off fixed by the constitution for cabinet membership. See supra note 30.
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For his part, F.W. de Klerk affirms that "the Government of National
Unity [GNU] has established a good working relationship, there's a
commitment in the GNU to make the system work, there is a growing
consensus on major goals."' Political violence has eased, though it is
still a serious problem;45 at least one opinion poll suggests that
relations between the races have improved." All of this suggests that
the consociational strategy reflected in the constitution is working well.
How long the new government can retain this initial harmony
is another question. Some South African observers predict that the
Government of National Unity will ultimately divide, as the "National
Party and Inkatha will withdraw from the government in time to reestablish their political identities for the next scheduled election in
1999."'4 Even now, ANC parliamentarians are working to establish
Parliament's prerogative to question and even to reject the proposals
of the government; the more this independent legislative function
becomes part of the South African scene, the less it will be possible for
the consensus-minded cabinet simply to work its will in Parliament."
Ironically, in South Africa the effect of freeing Parliament from
executive domination - in other words, of building the separation of
powers, which in the United States is seen as a limit on majority

44.
De Kierk Discusses 100 Days, Government of National Unity, MPs' Salaries,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File [hereinafter De Klerk Interview].
45.
See supra note 18.
46.
According to a news report, "[a] recent poll showed that 60 percent of
respondents in the greater Johannesburg area believed that different racial groups are
getting on better now, while 36 percent thought relations were unchanged. Only 4
percent thought the situation had worsened." Gwynne Dwyer, South Africa Finds a
Century Is Not Erased in 100 Days, San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 28, 1994, at G5.
47.
Patrick Collings, First100 Days of Mandela's Government, UPI, Aug. 16, 1994,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
48.
See Chris Louw, The Back Bench Seizes the Crown, Weekly Mail & Guardian
(Johannesburg), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1994, at 10. One prominent ANC legislator, Johnny de
Lange, is quoted in this article as saying that "[tihere is no reference whatsoever in the
constitution forcing the legislature to be part of the government of national unity." Id.
It is interesting to note that the ANC has also been taking steps to set up "a rough
parliamentary constituency system," in which each of its legislators, despite not having
been elected from a particular district, will be answerable to an ANC "sub-region"
structure. Anton Harber, From Trade Unionist to ANC 'Surgeon,' Weekly Mail &
Guardian (Johannesburg), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1994, at 13. The effect of this system might
be to reduce somewhat the influence that the ANC's executive branch leaders wield over
the individual legislators, who will now need to look to their sub-regions as well as to the
president and Cabinet.
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power - may be to weaken the limits on majority power built into the

functioning of the executive branch. ANC legislators have already
proposed to assign themselves the chairing of twenty-three of the
twenty-seven parliamentary standing committees overseeing cabinet

ministries, while granting the National Party the chairs only of four
"housekeeping" committees and none of the twenty-seven "portfolio
committees."' 9 Not surprisingly, F.W. de KIerk has already attacked

the ANC's parliamentary caucus,50 and one of the leaders of the ANC
parliamentary caucus, Cyril Ramaphosa, has responded by saying that
"[d]e Klerk has not acclimatised himself to being number three in the
government."51 Not everyone in South African politics is disposed to
be as statesmanlike as Nelson Mandela.52

49.
Nats Angry at ANC Stance on Committees, This Week in South Africa: News
Highlights from the South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug.
16-22, 1994, at 2; Buthelezi Backs Deputy Presidentde Klerk in ChairmanshipsRow, This
Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate
Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 23-29, 1994, at 1 (This Week in South Africa describes itself
as "compiled and produced by the South African Consulate General" in New York; its
reports "reflect[] the wording and terminology ofvarious newspapers."). A senior member
of Parliament from the National Party has since warned that "ANC attempts to shift the
balance of power in parliament away from the cabinet would be fought by the National
Party and could end up in the Constitutional Court." Chris Louw, ParliamentPower Play
Could Go to Court, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Sept. 2-8, 1994, at 11.
50.
De Klerk told a television interviewer that he sees "a lack of management by
the leadership of the ANC of its caucus," and "a tendency on the side of the ANC as a
party, as a caucus, to disregard the lead which they get from their leadership." De Kierk
Interview, supra note 44. In this interview, de Klerk offered a generally positive picture
of the first 100 days of the new government. Earlier he had reportedly declared that,
although the National Party "had decided to remain in the Government of National
Unity... 'the red lights are flashing.' "Nats Angry at ANC Stance on Committees, supra
note 49, at 2.
51.
Ramaphosa's words are quoted in Anton Harber, supra note 48. The reference
to de Klerk as "number three" in the government implicitly asserts that de Klerk is
junior not only to President Mandela but also to the other executive deputy president,
Thabo Mbeki, who was designated by the ANC. The constitution itself does not establish
any hierarchy among the executive deputy presidents.
52.
The difference in the positions of Ramaphosa and Mandela is reflected in their
responses to National Party criticism. Ramaphosa says that "[tihere is a growing feeling
in the ANC caucus that, if the NP wants to play this role of an opposition, then we don't
need to be that accommodating." Harber, supra note 48. Mandela, in contrast, told a
television interviewer that "the fact that we have a Government of National Unity, and
we are seeking consensus, does not mean that the minority parties are not in the
opposition. They are perfectly entitled to criticize the Government of National Unity." In
fact, he emphasized that "[olne of the things I am resisting, and I'll continue to resist,
is that the minority parties should feel that the Government of National Unity is a
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it remains to be seen
whether unity can be preserved without sacrificing the African
National Congress's ability to meet the long-postponed aspirations of
South Africa's black men and women."3 Consociational government
cannot work unless the group leaders making up the grand coalition
are enlightened enough to make it work, and this is never
guaranteed. 5' South Africa's leaders have, however, shown quite a
remarkable ability to respond to considerations of enlightened selfinterest in recent years, and it seems likely that the government will
be able to muster consensual support for a significant program of
reform."5 Certainly Nelson Mandela appears optimistic. He maintains
that the Reconstruction and Development Program, the government's
grand plan for redressing the grim heritage of apartheid, "is no longer
a programme of any particular party. It is now a programme for the
entire country. Every political party, every individual can now say with
confidence: This is my programme to better the lives of our
people .... "5
B.

Federalism

For Americans, consociational structures are still unfamiliar
and sometimes - as evident from the response to Lani Guinier, who
urged the adoption of somewhat similar structures as a way of

hollow shell, and that they are being used for the purpose of rubber-stamping what the
majority party has decided." Mandela Interview, supra note 43. It is not irrelevant to
understanding this apparent difference in views to know that Mandela chose not to
appoint Ramaphosa as an executive deputy president, and that Ramaphosa then chose
not to accept a position in the Cabinet. Chris Louw, Behind the Code Lies Cyril's Bid to
Win Power, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Sept. 16-22, 1994, at 6. With
respect to F.W. de Klerk in particular, however, Mandela and Ramaphosa may not be
far apart, for Mandela, often very generous in his response to opponents, is not always
so generous to de Klerk. Bill Keller, A Day in the Life of Mandela: Charm, Control, a Bit
of Acid, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1994, at Al.
53. See Bill Keller, Mandela Is Mr. Nice Guy, Irking Some Allies, N.Y. Times, June
23, 1994, at All.
54. See Lijphart, supra note 27, at 100-01; Horowitz, supra note 6, at 139-45;
Ellmann, supra note 22, at 465 n.30.
55.
At this writing, it seems likely that the next few months in South Africa will
witness something of a burst of legislative creativity, as the new government gets its
programs of reform under way. We will know much more about the likely successes and
failures of the government of national unity when this battery of new legislation is in
place.
56. Mandela Interview, supra note 43.
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enhancing blacks' access to political power in this country - taboo.57
Americans are more familiar with the idea of federalism as a
limitation on the power of a central government. For many in South
Africa, in particular for many who stood with the ANC, the idea of a
federal South Africa was anathema. 68 Nonetheless, I believe that
South Africa's new constitution, particularly as it was amended in
1994 as the ANC and the National Party sought to bring their
opponents into the election process, does give South Africa a federal
structure - but one in which the power of the component states, or
rather "provinces," is decidedly more limited than the authority of the
states which make up the United States of America.
Among the most important of the March 1994 amendments to
the constitution, at least symbolically, is one that actually did not
directly regulate the provinces' powers. This provision abandoned the
"single ballot" format for the elections, and declared instead that there
would be two ballots, one for the National Assembly and one for the
provincial legislatures.59 This change, a welcome one as a matter of
democratic principle, may well have helped persuade Buthelezi to
participate in the election (though he did not make that decision until
almost election eve). As a matter of pragmatic politics, the effect of this
provision could have been to give parties which might have been
unable to win great support at the national level a better chance of
electoral success in particular provincial governments - though as the
election turned out, there may have been relatively little of this sort of
ticket-splitting. To whatever extent (if any) this change actually
increased the voice of dissenting groups in the provincial governments,
it will tend to make those governments more important sites of
political struggle.
The amendments enhanced the power of the provinces in other
respects as well. The range of issues on which the provinces are
competent to legislate quite a long list even before these
amendments - is now even longer.60 The provinces' claim on national
revenues has been somewhat bolstered, as has their ability to impose

57.
Anthony Lewis has commented that South Africans "used proportional
representation to mitigate conflict; we mocked a Lani Guinier who thought we should
consider a form of PR for the same reason." Anthony Lewis, Miracle with Reasons, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 29, 1994, at A27.
58.
See supra note 26.
59.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act (Act No. 2, 1994),
§ 12, amending S. Afr. Const. sched. 2, § 15 [hereinafter March Amendments].
60.
Id. § 14, amending S. Afr. Const., sched. 6.
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taxes.6 1 But on all these scores the provinces' powers remain
decidedly circumscribed. The national Parliament retains concurrent
authority to legislate in all areas of provincial legislative competence.
The section specifying whose laws are supreme in the event of conflict
was rephrased in one of these amendments, but despite this rephrasing
the section still accords supremacy to national laws in a wide, perhaps
virtually limitless, set of circumstances.6 2 Parliament's discretion to
allocate funds among the provinces remains substantial.' The
provinces' taxing authority remains very limited." And while the
constitution somewhat bolsters the position of the provinces by
requiring that various legislation affecting them be passed not only by
the National Assembly but also by the Senate,6 whose members
presumably are more attentive to the provinces' interests than are the
members of the National Assembly,66 the impact of this requirement
is diluted by the fact that the ANC has a clear majority in both
houses.6 7

61.
Id. §§ 3-7.
62.
Id. § 2, amending S. Aft. Const. § 126.
63.
Id. § 3, amending S. Afr. Const. § 155.
64.
Id. § 4, amending S. Afr. Const. § 156.
65.
S. Afr. Const. § 61. The March Amendments extended - or at least made
explicit - the application of § 61 procedures in connection with several aspects of
provincial finances. March Amendments, supra note 59, §§ 3(b), 4(b), 5(b). The Senate's
role is more substantial when Parliament is considering amendments to §§ 126 and 144,
which define the provinces' spheres of legislative and executive authority; separate
approval by two-thirds of the members of each house of Parliament is required to enact
such amendments. Id. § 62(2). Other provisions of the constitution can be amended
whenever two-thirds of the total number of members of the two houses - in other words,
327 out of the total of 490 members - vote for them. Id. § 62(1). Since the National
Assembly has 400 members, most provisions of the interim constitution can be amended
even over the unanimous opposition of the Senate.
66.
It is my understanding that the members of the Senate were selected by the
provinces, though the constitution did not mandate exactly this procedure. See S. Aft.
Const. § 48(1) (providing for nomination of senators by the political parties represented
in provincial legislatures, rather than by the legislatures themselves). In practice, the
legislatures may simply have ratified the political parties' choices. Cf. Brendan Boyle,
ANC Dominates FirstAll-Race S. African Senate, Reuters World Service, May 19, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File (describing the Senate as "nominated
by [the] nine provincial parliaments," while also reporting a statement by a Senate
spokesman referring to the number of senators whom the ANC "would nominate").
67.
The ANC won absolute majorities in six of the nine provincial legislatures; in
a seventh it won exactly half the seats but won the provincial premiership with the aid
of the Democratic Party and apparently with the tacit support of the right-wing Freedom
Front. See Patti Waldmeir & Michael Holman, South African Elections: Spirit of
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Perhaps the most significant direct addition to the provinces'
powers, however, deals neither with money nor with ordinary
legislative competence, but rather with the provinces' authority to
frame their own constitutions. As adopted in 1993, the interim
constitution closely regulated much of what the provincial constitutions
would be permitted to say." By virtue of the March 1994
amendments, the national constitution now provides that provinces can
structure their legislative and executive branches in ways that depart
from the start-up rules (as they can now be seen) which the national
constitution originally provided for the provinces' governance.6 9 The
April 1994 amendments explicitly permit provincial constitutions to
"provide for the institution, role, authority and status of a traditional
monarch in the province," anywhere in the country, and require such
provision for the Zulu king in the province of KwaZulu/Natal. °
The April amendments make almost explicit what perhaps was
implicit even in March, namely that the province of KwaZulu/Natal
can adopt a constitution making itself a constitutional monarchy
within South Africa.7" The powers of such a monarch would be

ConciliationSweeps Aside Letter of Vote, Fin. Times (London), May 7, 1994, at 3; Chris

Louw, The Big Hole in the NorthernCape, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May
13-19, 1994, at 12. These legislatures then chose the national Senate, see supra note 66,
and 60 of the 90 members of the national Senate turned out to be from the ANC, South
African Senators Sworn in, Coetsee Made Their President,Agence France Presse, May
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. This two-thirds majority is
actually greater than the ANC's majority in the National Assembly, where the ANC
holds 252 of the 400 seats. See Elections: Final Returns from South Africa, N.Y. Times,
May 7, 1994, at 8.
68. See S. Aft. Const. § 160(3)(a) (directing that provincial constitutions "shall not
be inconsistent with" the extensive specifications contained in the national constitution's
chapter on provincial government, id. §§ 125-59).
69.
March Amendments, supra note 59, § 8, amending S. Aft. Const. § 160.
70.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 1994 (Act
3 of 1994), § 1, amending S. Aft. Const. § 160 [hereinafter April Amendments].
71.
As the March Amendments were being prepared, Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC's
lead negotiator, observed that under the proposed amendments "[pirovinces would be
able to decide on what structure they would like to have.... For instance, a province
could decide to have a constitutional monarch. When their parliament opens, he could
sit on a very high chair with diamonds and gold and silver and all that. They could build
him a palace as big as Johannesburg." Michael Hill, S. Africa Scramblesfor Consensus,
Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 19, 1994, at 17 (quoting Ramaphosa) (paragraph break omitted).
The flavor of KwaZulu/Natal sentiment for the Zulu king is reflected in this account of
opening day in the KwaZulu/Natal legislature: "And when Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini
swept into the chambers, the ANC bench jumped up along with everyone else to shout,
in salute, 'Wena ndlovu!' ('You're the elephant.') King Goodwill expressed confidence that,
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bounded by both national legislative competence and the constitutional
guarantees of human rights. However, exactly how those limits will
interact with possible provincial constitutional provisions dealing with
the "institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch"
remains to be seen. Thus far, the government has apparently been able
to avoid any definitive exploration of the powers of the Zulu monarchy.
For example, even a shadowy transfer of tremendous amounts of land
owned by the now-defunct homeland of KwaZulu to the authority of
the Zulu King just before the April elections7 2 did not prove to be an
insurmountable problem, as the government and the King reportedly
found a way to share authority over the land in question.75
Finally, the interim constitution seeks to quell anxiety, on the
part of those who pressed for greater provincial authority, that any
concessions made in the interim constitution would simply be erased
when the final constitution was written. Even as adopted in 1993, the
interim constitution included a constitutional principle giving the
provinces significant insulation from such a diminution of their

now, peace would surely reign in 'my kingdom.' "Olojede, supra note 7.
72.
Bill Keller, Secret Zulu Land Transfer Poses First Crisis for Mandela, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1994, at A3.
73.
See Cabinet Resolves Zulu Land Dispute, This Week in South Africa: News
Highlights from the South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), June
14-20, 1994, at 2. That this accommodation was possible reflects another of the
developments of South Africa's complex ethnic politics - namely, the break between
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party, and the
Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini. Buthelezi, in his capacity as leader of the KwaZulu
"homeland" within apartheid South Africa, had long ago wielded his power over the
King's budget to bring the King under his control. In February of this year, as the crisis
over Inkatha's boycott of the elections grew ever more acute, Zwelithini met with F.W.
de Klerk and "raised the stakes by demanding that the entire province [of Natal] be
given to him as a sovereign monarchy," though Buthelezi claimed that Zwelithini acted
without telling him in advance. Bill Keller, Zulu Leader Is More Isolated But Is Still
Proudly Resistant,N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1994, at Al. Now, however, Zwelithini seems to
have escaped somewhat from Buthelezi's power, and appears to be taking a much more
moderate stance. Supporters of the ANC reportedly describe this development as the
"liberation" of the King, while Buthelezi in a public speech recently "bluntly reminded
the monarch that 'his kingly way of life' is paid for by the Inkatha-controlled provincial
government. He intimated that the King's life might be in danger." Bill Keller, Zulu
Royalists Fight For Region, But Forfeit Their King's Allegiance, N.Y. Times, June 20,
1994, at A7; see Farouk Chothia, Edged Out, But Buthelezi Fights Back, Weekly Mail &
Guardian (Johannesburg), June 17-23, 1994, at 4. The conflict between Buthelezi and
Zwelithini has now grown even more acute. See Bill Keller, Zulu King Breaks Ties To
Buthelezi, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1994 at All.
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powers.7" Moreover, this and other constitutional principles are not
just expressions of lofty sentiment, as the Constitutional Court is
responsible for enforcing them when it reviews the proposed final

constitution.

5

The amendments, however, ensure that in the final

constitution the provinces' powers, including their power to write their
own constitutions, "shall not be substantially less than or substantially
inferior to those provided for" in the interim constitution.7 6 The final
constitution must also "recognise[] and protect[]" provincial

constitutional provisions that are adopted with respect to the status of
traditional monarchs." The amendments also secure the provincial
boundaries established by the interim constitution, presumably to

remove any fear of boundary manipulation by the Constitutional
Assembly.7 8 The result is to insure that the final constitution will be

no less federalist than the interim constitution.
The interim constitution's handling of the provinces represents

a significant shift or concession by the ANC. At one point, the ANC
apparently felt that fixing "the powers, functions and even the
boundaries of future regional government" before the election of the

Constituent

Assembly

would

be

"clearly

undemocratic

and

unacceptable"79 - but the transitional constitution goes a substantial
distance in this very direction. At the same time, however, the ANC's

negotiators appear to have carefully protected the real power of the
national government vis-&-vis the provinces.
I believe that the adoption of a federal system for South Africa

should not be seen as a defeat for opponents of apartheid. Such a
74.
S. Afr. Const. sched. 4, princ. XVIII; see also id. princs. XX, XXII.
75.
S. Afr. Const. § 71(2).
76.
March Amendments, supra note 59, § 13, amending S. Air. Const. sched. 4,
princ. XVIII(2).
77.
April Amendments, supranote 70, § 2, amending S. Afr. Const. sched. 4, princ.
XIII.
78.
March Amendments, supra note 59, § 13(a), amending S. Afr. Const. sched. 4,
princ. XVIII(3). In certain respects, however, the interim constitution makes clear that
the provincial boundaries it sets out are not final, and that what Principle XVIII(3)
protects is the provincial boundaries established "in terms of' the interim constitution in other words, the boundaries that emerge out of the process of boundary
reconsideration provided for in the interim constitution itself. S. Afr. Const. § 124(2).
Among the possible changes alluded to by Section 124(2) would be the division of one
province, the Eastern Cape, into two. See Mark Suzman, South African Elections:Newlyformed Regions Prepareto Flex Their Muscles, Fin. Times (London), May 7, 1994, at 3.
79.
ANC Regional Policy: Draft Discussion Document 5 (October 1992) (described
as "A Document of the Constitutional Committee and the Department of Land &
Regional Government & Housing").
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system can helpfully restrain the power of the national government,
while not depriving it of the authority it needs. The new arrangements
appear to leave the national government with such authority. It
remains to be seen, however, whether in practice the new provinces
have the power they need to become meaningful and effective political
entities, and whether they - with or without real governmental
powers - become the bases for divisive, even ultimately secessionist,
ethnic politics.
The verdict is not yet in on either of these scores. It does seem
that the provinces are rapidly becoming sites of political struggle and
perhaps even bases for political ambition,'0 though the process of
assigning them concrete authority has been slow.8' Zola Skweyiya, a
leading ANC member and now the minister of public service and
Administration, has gone so far as to say that " '[the main
confrontation in the constituent assembly is not going to be between
the ANC-NP-IFP [that is, between the largest political parties] but
between the (ANC-led) national government and regional premiers of
the ANC.' "82 The provinces should become fields of struggle and
ambition if they are to be significant political institutions. This
development may also generate political momentum that will help the
provinces to claim additional authority if their current powers prove
inadequate. Yet it is troubling to have to acknowledge that in
KwaZulu/Natal, the only province in which Inkatha holds majority
power, and the only one in which black secessionist politics have
already shown great appeal, relations between Inkatha and the ANC

80. Thus, the provinces have already seen battles over the location of the
provincial capitals, as well as the beginnings of conflict between provincial and national
officials in areas of overlapping responsibility. See Chris Louw, Conflict Over the Capital

Business, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 17-23, 1994, at 13; Suzman,
supra note 78. There has also been newspaper speculation that at least one provincial
premier might be positioning himself for a run for the national presidency, much as

governors in the United States have been known to do. See The Houses That Tokyo Will
Build, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July 15-21, 1994, at 26 (editorial
discussing the dispute over housing policy between the national government and Tokyo
Sexwale, premier of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging province).
81.
The government reportedly indicated in August 1994 that "it would be years

before the process [of allocation of powers to the provinces] was completed." Provincial
Empowerment to 'Take Years," This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the
South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 9-15, 1994, at 2.
82. Patti Waldmeir, Survey of South Africa, Fin. Times (London), July 18, 1994,
at VII. The words "(ANC-led)" are apparently an insertion by Waldmeir.
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are so deadlocked that the goal of what might be called a "government
of provincial unity" seems completely out of reach.'
C.

The Accommodation of the Civil Service and Security Forces

The newly elected leaders of South Africa will preside over the
apparatus of the State, including the civil or public service, the police
and the military. The makeup of these institutions is an issue with
ramifications for the future of ethnic and racial politics in South
Africa. In part, this is because those who occupy these positions can
significantly affect the shaping and implementation of government
policies. In addition, many of these jobs have been part of the
apparatus of white privilege in the past and could become part of
affirmative action programs in the future.
Officials who dominate the senior positions in these institutions
today are predominantly white, and many or most may still harbor
strong sympathies for the apartheid order they served for many years.
The negotiators of the interim constitution decided to provide
considerable protection for these officials' vested interests. To do so
made sense, as a way of avoiding the alienation of people who could
become very troublesome opponents, and whose expertise in many
cases was probably still needed. Thus, the new constitution provides
that officials now employed in public service jobs will continue in them
after the new constitution enters into force," and also protects these

83.
On the state of KwaZulu/Natal politics, see Farouk Chothia, Natal in Chaos
as PartiesArgue On, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 24-30, 1994, at 4.
It may be a mildly promising sign that the KwaZulu/Natal legislature reportedly planned
to convene on August 23, 1994, for its first session since its inauguration.
KwaZulu INatalLegislature Set to Meet for FirstTime, This Week in South Africa: News
Highlights from the South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug.
23-29, 1994, at 2.
The interim constitution does not use the phrase "government of provincial
unity," but it does provide that the provincial Executive Councils, the counterparts to the
national Cabinet, "shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensusseeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the
need for effective government." S. Afr. Const. § 150(2). Like the national Cabinet,
moreover, the Executive Councils are to be selected through proportional representation,
and any party with at least ten percent of the seats in a provincial legislature is entitled
to such representation on the province's council. Id. § 149(2).
84.
S. Afr. Const. § 236(2).
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officials'
already-accrued pensions and their current retirement
5
ages.8

However, the interim constitution also affords the government
a considerable measure of discretion to reform these institutions. In
particular, the constitution allows efforts to make the public service
more representative of South Africa's full population, and permits
legislation and presidential action which may alter many of the terms
and conditions of employment of the current officials and perhaps
eliminate their jobs. 6 These provisions also make sense because they
help to open a new field of opportunity for black South Africans, and
also because they make it easier for the government to build a civil
service genuinely committed to overturning the heritage of apartheid.
What use the Government of National Unity will make of these powers
remains to be seen, however, and their exact dimensions remain to be
interpreted. 7 In the meantime, it seems quite likely that the
considerable protection given to present officeholders has impeded
efforts to bring change to the civil service.8

85.
Id. § 212(7)(a) & (b).
86.
See id. §§ 236(4), 237.
87.
One indication of the government's plans, and of the obstacles those plans may
encounter, is a reported "Government draft proposal to rationalize the public service
[which] provides for dismissing public servants who are not prepared to be transferred
to different towns, and voluntary redundancies for public servants who cannot be found
jobs as a result of restructuring. Public service employee organizations expressed concern
on Tuesday, August 23 that the Government could use the scheme to circumvent an
understanding in the constitution of job security in the public service." Government's
Plan to Restructure Public Service Puts Jobs on the Line, This Week in South Africa:
News Highlights from the South African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.),
Aug. 23-29, 1994, at 3.
88.
There are a number of signs of these difficulties. A significant number of ANC
employees who had hoped for government jobs, but were not senior enough to move into
the highest positions, were reported to be encountering great difficulty in getting these
jobs. One reason for this was said to be the job protections enjoyed by officials of the old
regime. (Perhaps another reason was sheer inefficiency on the part of the Ministry of
Public Service and Administration, which must approve all new appointments. Shell
Shocked Over Cutbacks, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July 22-28, 1994, at
4.) Most of these people did ultimately find government positions, however, either in the
various legislatures or "the civil service, notably the security and intelligence forces."
Harber, supra note 48.
The Ministry of Education has been described as "still in the grip of'old guard'
apartheid-era bureaucrats." Philippa Garson, Ministry of Paralysis?,Weekly Mail &
Guardian (Johannesburg), July 22-28, 1994, at 10. Meanwhile, in the highly sensitive
Ministry of Safety and Security (i.e., the police ministry), Minister Sydney Mufamadi of
the ANC "faces a problem [which] sets him apart from other ministers with tough
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Protection of Racial Minorities In Local Government

Although the constitution directs that "local government[s]
shall be elected democratically," 9 the election procedures specified
certainly do not comply with the principle of one person, one vote.
Instead, they follow the rule that "[a] voter shall not have more than
one vote per local government." ° Each voter can vote in the town
where she lives, and also in those other towns where she is liable for
"property rates, rent, service charges or levies to that local
government."9' This allocation of the franchise seems to give those
who enjoy economic privilege a political bonus as well.
In addition, the constitution provides that local government
elections are to utilize "both proportional and ward representation,"9 2
rather than the purely proportional system which elects the National
Assembly. 9 Another provision, worded with considerable delicacy,

agendas: he does not have a staff. And he won't be getting one.... Two months after the
election, Mufamadi has not been able to employ his own civilian advisers." As a result,
the liberal Weekly Mail & Guardian called his ministry a "one-man department."
Minister in Charge of an Empty Office, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July
15-21, 1994, at 1. But some ministers have apparently found ways to bring in more of
their own people. Garson, supra. In particular, ten ANC ministers have chosen to employ
consultants, who apparently do not have to meet civil service requirements; perhaps not
surprisingly, the Ministry of Safety and Security has eight such advisers, more than any
other. Paul Stober, What the Advisers Can Earn, Weekly Mail & Guardian
(Johannesburg), Sept. 2-8, 1994, at 2.
Joe Slovo, the communist leader who is now minister of housing, "dismiss[ed]
the director of the housing department and put in a man he trusted," and a spokesman
explained that" 'lilt is common practice internationally' to purge department heads when
a new Government takes power," but "[a]lmost a month into the Mandela presidency, Mr.
Slovo [was] still the only Cabinet minister who [had] dismissed any prominent
official ... ." Bill Keller, Same Old BureaucracyServes a New South Africa, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 1994, at 1. Keller also mentions that "[s]ome top officials moved into offices that
had been stripped of furniture, files and computers." Id. More often, however, the
holdover bureaucrats' tack has been to make themselves "instantly indispensable," id.,
a strategy that certainly helps explain why so few have lost their jobs.
Discontent over the constraining influence of civil servants on the cabinet
ministers whom they serve has reportedly fueled the ANC legislators' desire to establish
their right to scrutinize and challenge cabinet decisions. See supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text. See also Louw, supra note 48.
89. S. Afr. Const. § 179(1).
90. Id. § 179(4) (emphasis added).
91.
Id. § 179(3)(a).
92. Id. § 179(2).
93. Id. § 40(1).
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directs that in the first local government elections held under the new
constitution, sixty percent of the members of local governments shall
be elected from wards. Moreover, half of these wards will be allocated
to areas apparently defined so as to exclude any areas in which
Africans lawfully resided prior to the recent end of de jure segregation
in South Africa.' In theory, the result of this system might be local
government councils on which Africans hold a majority, albeit a
smaller one than that to which their population would entitle them. It
also seems within the realm of possibility, however, that some
majority-African localities will have non-African majorities on their
governing councils. This could be cause for celebration if it resulted
from voters' decisions to disregard race in their balloting. However, if
fewer Africans than non-Africans turn out to vote - not an
implausible result of the lifelong disadvantages faced by Africans then they might lose control of governing councils even where race is
very much a factor in everyone's voting.95
It is worth emphasizing that local governments will wield
significant authority under this constitution. Their autonomy is given
rhetorical protection by the constitution, though the promise of
autonomy is heavily qualified by the specification that these
governments "shall be entitled to regulate [their] affairs" "within the
limits prescribed by or under law."96 More concretely, local
governments have a quite substantial authority to tax - a greater tax
power, apparently, than that enjoyed by provincial governments.9 7
Local governments also have, or at least can be granted, the power to
establish their own municipal police forces.9'
The fact that these powers have been placed in the hands of
governments selected through a system that departs from the principle

94.
Id. § 245(b). See Secretariat of the Local Government Negotiating Forum, A
New Dispensation for Local Government 12 (n.d. - 1993?).
95.
Cf. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413-17 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1135 (1985) (emphasizing that for a racial or ethnic minority group to enjoy an
effective voice in elections it may well need to make up sixty-five percent of the
jurisdiction's population).
Perhaps this reality is part of the reason that the actual drawing of new
municipal borders - to replace the race-based lines of the past - is apparently falling
behind schedule, and that the first post-apartheid elections, for which these boundaries
must be established, may also not take place on time. See Chris Louw, PressureMounts
Over Local Elections, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 17-23, 1994, at 13.
96.
S. Afr. Const. § 174(3).
97.
Id. § 178(2). See id. § 156.
98.
Id. § 221(3).
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of racial equality is perhaps the most disturbing of the various
compromises embodied in the new constitution. But it is important to
remember that the system of local government envisioned in these
provisions will provide much less protection for the privileged than did
the old order. Moreover, in practice these arrangements may prove
valuable in assuaging the anxieties of the privileged while facilitating
reforms that benefit the victims of apartheid. But what if these
provisions are not so successful? Even then we may not be justified in
labeling these provisions "mistakes." These provisions may have been
essential, pragmatic responses to the negotiating position of those
people, particularly whites, with the power to impede the transition
from apartheid to democracy. 99 Only a detailed study of the
negotiations themselves and an appraisal of the results of these
provisions in practice will allow us to make a final judgment about the
wisdom of the constitution's partial protection of local privilege.
E.

Providing for Consideration of a Volkstaat

It is hard to believe that a future South Africa will come to
include a "volkstaat," or homeland, for whites. The very idea seems
incongruous in the context of a constitutional transition whose central
purpose is to enable black South Africans to enjoy democratic rights in
their own country. The notion of a volkstaat is also perplexing in the
very prosaic (but important) sense that it is apparently impossible to
identify, without gerrymandering, any substantial geographical area
in South Africa where whites are a majority.'00 Nevertheless, a
significant body of white or Afrikaner sentiment has congealed around
the idea of a volkstaat, and many whites who hold these views have

99.
These provisions do not, however, go as far as the National Party originally
proposed. Their suggested distributions of the franchise might have been even more
inegalitarian than those ultimately adopted. Perhaps the most striking of the
Nationalists' proposals, however, was one providing that neighborhoods be given "an
option for self-determination over community interests," an option that could include the
power to tax and authority over "the regulation of norms and standards for the
residential environment" and "security ... and civil protection matters." National Party
Framework, supra note 41, at 17-18.
100. The white right has toyed with various responses to this problem, such as
"financial incentives" to induce blacks to leave the volkstaat once its borders are laid out,
volkstaat constitutional provisions entrenching an Afrikaner majority in the volkstaat
legislature, and inducing more whites to move to the new volkstaat. For a description of
some of these ideas, see Jan Taljaard, Bizarre Solutions to Volkstaat Problems, Weekly
Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Oct. 15-21, 1993, at 4.
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just expressed them in the ballot boxes of the nonracial election."1
They were persuaded to do so, in part, through the adoption of
constitutional amendments designed to allow continued debate
over,
10 2
and advocacy of, a volkstaat within the new South Africa.
Two sections of the constitution now provide for the
establishment of a Volkstaat Council, 0 3 and a new constitutional
principle also attempts generally to accommodate communities' claims
of self-determination within South Africa."° The Volkstaat Council
was elected by those members of Parliament who support the volkstaat
idea, 0 5 and is to "serve as a constitutional mechanism to enable"
volkstaat proponents "to constitutionally pursue the establishment of
such a Volkstaat.1 6 However, the Council's powers are limited.
Unless Parliament grants it more authority, the Council can only
study, propose and advocate.0 7 But South Africa's new leaders have
demonstrated more than once their desire for domestic peace and their
willingness to fashion compromises to achieve that goal. 0 s President

101.
The Freedom Front, which campaigned under the banner of achieving a
volkstaat through constitutional means, won 2.2% of the vote. See supra note 2.
102.
Recently, the Freedom Front has reportedly been maneuvering to deny equal
negotiating status to its right-wing competitors, the Conservative Party and the
Afrikaner Volksfront, on the ground that the Freedom Front "has paid its dues by
participating in the election." Jan Taljaard, Battle to Represent the Right, Weekly Mail
& Guardian (Johannesburg), June 17-23, 1994, at 11. How successful the Freedom Front
will be in this endeavor is not entirely clear. In August 1994, President Mandela met
with the Conservative Party's leader for discussions which he called "fruitful," and
subsequently declared that since the election "[t]he whole scenario has changed... and
the ability of leaders, even from the right wing, to see that it is necessary for us to speak
out, sit down and sort out our problems.., is being widely accepted today." Mandela
Interview, supra note 43.
103.
S. Afr. Const. §§ 184A, 184B (inserted by March Amendments, supranote 59,
§ 9).
104. S. Afr. Const. sched. 4, princ. XXXIV (inserted by March Amendments, supra
note 59, § 13(b)).
105.
S. Afr. Const. § 184A(2) (inserted by March Amendments, supranote 59, § 9).
106.
Id. § 184B(1).
107. Id.
108.
Executive Deputy President Thabo Mbeki of the ANC spoke at the Volkstaat
Council's inauguration ceremony on June 16, 1994, and reportedly said that "the
government of national unity acknowledged it could not dictate terms to Afrikaner
nationalists seeking self-determination." Reuters World Service, untitled article, June
16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. File. He also praised the members of
the Freedom Front for their willingness to pursue this issue through the electoral and
constitutional process: "We'd like to pay sincere tribute to them because they saved the
country from a conflict that would have been very destructive." Id.
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Mandela has recently gone so far as to flirt with the idea of a whitesonly referendum on the volkstaat idea.'0 9 While no volkstaat may
ever emerge from the Constitutional Assembly, it is quite possible that
provisions of the final constitution will seek in some way to
accommodate the emotional appeal of Afrikaner nationalism. ° A
new constitutional principle not only promises that if a volkstaat is
established before the final constitution is adopted, the final
constitution will preserve it, but also declares more generally - if halfheartedly - that the interim constitution does not preclude
"constitutional provision for a notion of the right to self-determination
by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage,
whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other
recognized way.Di

F.

Evaluating the Structural Provisions

The constitution's structural arrangements are transitional
rather than permanent. Some, such as the Government of National
Unity, will probably not be retained beyond the transitional period.
Others, such as the elements of the federal structure, may yet be
further elaborated. For now, their value is three-fold. First, these
various concessions helped to secure the support of the National Party,
and the grudging accommodation of Inkatha and the Freedom Front,

109. See Christopher Munnion, Mandela Calls Right's Bluff, Daily Telegraph
(London), June 4, 1994, at 15.
A recent report suggests that the Volkstaat Council may plan to submit
110.
proposals to the Government of National Unity as early as September 1994, and that
these proposals will "not be a demand for the immediate establishment of a volkstaat but
will contain several interim measures that the volkstaaters believe will eventually lead
to further independence." A Volkstaat Council spokesman, Koos van Rensburg,
reportedly "views the volkstaat... as more of an additional province with stronger
regional powers than those currently afforded to the provinces," and maintains that the
volkstaat "will have to be acceptable to the majority of South Africans. Thatever is
proposed can't be allowed to create conflict,' he said." Jan Taljaard, Boshoff Proposes a
'Silicon Volkstaat', Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Aug. 12-18, 1994, at 4. This
is a tall order, but clearly some South Africans are seriously trying to achieve it.
111.
S. Afr. Const. sched. 4, princ. XXXIV(1), as amended by March Amendments,
supra note 59, § 13(b). This acknowledgement of the possibility of territorial or nonterritorial self-determination within South Africa is consistent with at least some
understandings of the right of self-determination in international law today. See Frederic
L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United
Nations Era, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 304 (1994); Robert McCorquodale, South Africa and the
Right of Self-Determination, 10 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 4 (1994).
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and thus made South Africa's first nonracial election possible. This is
not to say, however, that each of these concessions necessarily was
essential to the deal; indeed, scholars have already confirmed that the
South African constitutional negotiations suffered from their share of
human error and miscalculation." 2 Second, the constitutional
arrangements provide a possible path by which the fractious groups
within South Africa may live together and get used to resolving their
differences peacefully rather than by command and by force. Third,
they offer a route by which a venerable democratic ideal - namely,
that all people in a society should have some real say in their
government, and should be protected from the overwhelming power of
any one faction or structure - may be realized.
But, as we say in the United States, the jury is still out. We do
not know how much unity these structures will actually foster. We do
not know whether the voice given to whites and to Zulu will be used
to impede reforms aimed at redressing the injustices of the past, or to
build power bases that will ultimately lead to a more divided South
Africa. We also do not know whether these structures will provide
meaningful restraints on the aspirations of the national government,
which may prove as subject as United States institutions sometimes
are said to be to the hydraulic pressure of the quest for power. Nor do
we know whether these structures will give individual citizens even as
strong a voice in their government as that enjoyed by United States
citizens, or whether instead they will place undue power in the hands
of the political elites. All of this remains to be seen. For now, we must
simply recognize how wide-ranging the precautions, or compromises,
are that South Africa has taken in an effort to accommodate ethnic
and racial tension through the structure of its government. And, of
course, we should hope for the success of these devices, and for their
wise reform to whatever extent they prove imperfect.
III. THE FASHIONING OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

While structure is important, rights are, too. Constitutional
rights can be fashioned so as to enlist national authority in the
112.

See Matthew Chaskalson, Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of

South Africa and the Negotiations over Property Rights (unpublished paper, presented
at the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, June 1994); Thandabantu Nhlapo,
African Customary Law of the Family and Women's Human Rights in the New South
African Constitution: The Problem of Cultural Diversity (unpublished paper, presented
at the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, June 1994).
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protection of minority solidarity (for example, by entrenching rights to
engage in private discrimination in the practice of one's culture) or
instead to bring national power to bear on the disestablishment of
minority privilege (by mandating nondiscrimination, or more radically
by mandating redistribution of wealth). Let us consider two aspects of
the new constitution's chapter on fundamental rights - its provisions
concerning private discrimination and those concerning redistribution
of property. These two sets of provisions share an overarching
similarity: in each case, the government is granted authority to
challenge past injustice, but in each case as well the government's
power to do so is somewhat constrained.
Thus, the new constitution does not explicitly proscribe most
forms of private discrimination. In this respect the new constitution
resembles the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as it is currently interpreted."' The ANC had hoped to
establish constitutional rights that would in many respects be
applicable to private individuals as well as to the state," 4 and in
particular would have placed "[tihe State and all public and private
bodies ... under a duty to prevent any form of incitement to racial,
religious or linguistic hostility and to dismantle all structures and do
away with all practices that compulsorily divide the population on
grounds of race, colour, language, gender or creed."" 5 The old
government apparently successfully withstood the ANC's arguments
for such provisions, with one significant exception - a prohibition on

113.
As is well known, this interpretation draws textual support from the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in part that "[n]o state shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. In the field of race discrimination, the significance of the state action requirement
is significantly, though by no means totally, reduced by the fact that the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition on slavery is understood to bar acts of enslavement by private
as well as public actors. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-23 (1883); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971). Perhaps even more importantly, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress has the power to use its authority under the Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, to outlaw private discrimination that substantially
affects interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
114.
Constitutional Committee of the African National Congress, ANC Draft Bill
of Rights art. 17(1) (Preliminary Revised Version, Feb. 1993) ("The terms of the Bill of
Rights shall be binding upon the State and organs of government at all levels, and where

appropriate, on all social institutions and persons.").
115.
Id. art. 15(3).
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new schools that discriminate on the basis of race. 116 Otherwise,
private rights that could be discriminatory, such as the freedom of
association and the right to participation in the cultural life of one's
choice, are protected. 7 Moreover, while the new constitution
protects a wide range of rights from invasion by the government, these
limits on the government do not explicitly constrain private
individuals, because the chapter on fundamental rights by its terms
binds only "legislative and executive organs of state.""' Language
that would have unmistakably bound private individuals as well "was
rejected deliberately," according to a South African scholar who
participated in the negotiations. 9

S. Afr. Const. § 32(c). The old government's proposed bill of rights would
116.
probably have established a constitutional right to set up private, discriminatory schools.
Republic of South Africa, Government's Proposals on a Charter of Fundamental Rights,
§§ 14(6) (right to establish private schools), 22(3) (freedom not to associate) (Feb. 2, 1993)
[hereinafter Government's Proposals].
117.
S. Afr. Const. §§ 17 (freedom of association), 31 (participation in the cultural
life of one's choice).
118.
Id. § 7(1). This formulation not only omits private actors from the reach of the
fundamental rights provisions but also leaves out the judiciary. Compare id. § 4(2)
(providing that the constitution as a whole binds "all legislative, executive and judicial
organs of state.. .") (emphasis added). A South African scholar, T.W. Bennett, has
commented that the language of § 7(1) "will presumably supersede the more general
[§] 4(2)" with respect to the application of the chapter on fundamental rights. T. W.
Bennett, The Equality Clause and Customary Law, 10 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 122, 126
n.23 (1994).
119.
Etienne Mureinik, Emergingfrom Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa,
92 Mich. L. Rev. 1977, 1987-88 n.35 (1994) (reviewing Stephen Ellmann, In a Time of
Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency (1992)). Mureinik does
not regard this drafting decision as foreclosing the application of provisions from the
chapter on fundamental rights to private conduct. Id. It is worth noting, in this regard,
that § 7 of the constitution does not include the explicit disclaimer of application to
private parties that appeared in the Government's Proposals, supra note 116, § 2(1). But
Mureinik, like T. W. Bennett, points to a Canadian Supreme Court case, Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 33 D.L.R. 4th
174 (1986), which construed language similar to (and actually less clear-cut than) § 7(1)
to mean, in Bennett's words, that "the Canadian Charter did not override common law
unless the executive or legislative branches of the government were involved .... "
Bennett, supra note 119, at 126 n.23; Mureinik, supra, at 1987-88 n.35. Indeed, it is hard
not to read § 7(1) as reflecting a desire to confine the application of the chapter on
fundamental rights to the review of government actions, although determining when the
government should be seen as acting is of course a very complex matter - one which the
American "state action" doctrine attempts to handle.
Bennett, borrowing a principle of German constitutional law, goes on to
suggest that the rights chapter could properly be applied to private actors where "private
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Instead, the new government is granted the authority to
legislate against "unfair" private discrimination. 2 ° In placing the
task of controlling private discrimination in the hands of the
legislature, the South African constitutional negotiators adopted a
solution quite comparable to that created by modem U.S.
constitutional law. 2 ' What this means is that the scope of what is
to be proscribed as unfair will be decided in the first instance, during
the next five years, by what is envisioned to be a "Government of
National Unity," albeit one led by the ANC. Moreover, the
government's decisions on this score (and others) will be subject to
review by a Constitutional Court charged with enforcing the provisions
of the constitution.'2 2 The government can act against private
discrimination, but it will have to choose to act, and its choices will be
subject to political and legal constraints. These constraints may well
circumscribe to some extent the nature of the South African civil rights
legislation of the future, but I expect that this legislation will still be
far-reaching, and that the very existence of these constraints may help
to cement the national consensus in favor of the new laws.

law" granted the courts broad discretion or did not supply precise and clear rules to
govern the matter. Bennett, supra note 114, at 127. To the extent that this argument
simply suggests using the fundamental rights provisions to interpret other aspects of
South African law, it is clearly supported by § 35(3) of the constitution, which directs
that "[imn the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the
common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and
objects of this Chapter." S.Afr. Const. § 35(3). It does not seem to me, however, that this
constitutional language offers strong support for the idea that provisions of the chapter
on fundamental rights can be used to invalidate - rather than to interpret - rules
bearing on the relations between private individuals that would otherwise escape the
ambit of § 7(1).
Resolving the exact reach of the chapter on fundamental rights may well
become one of the tasks of South Africa's new Constitutional Court.
S. Afr. Const. § 33(4).
120.
See supra note 113.
121.
122.
The importance of this court to South Africa's future made the fashioning of
the system of appointing the court's members a subject of intense debate. The system
ultimately adopted in §§ 97(2) and 99 seems meant partially to insulate appointments
to the court from purely political considerations. The results so far have been very
promising. The court will be presided over by Arthur Chaskalson, a principal drafter of
the new constitution and an exceptional man, deeply committed to the struggle against
apartheid. He will be joined by four members of the existing judiciary, including Ismail
Mohamed, a leading anti-apartheid lawyer who became the first black judge of the South
African Supreme Court; Richard Goldstone and Laurence Ackermann, two prominent
white judges known for their opposition to apartheid; and Tholakele Madala, a member
of the Transkei Supreme Court.
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Similarly, the new constitution mandates attention to the land
claims of some of those whom apartheid dispossessed. 123 In some
circumstances, it appears to contemplate expropriation of land - if the
state certifies that such expropriation is "feasible" - on payment of
compensation that may be less than full market value. 12" But at the
same time, the new constitution requires considerable attention to the
interests of the present holders of land, attention that seems likely to
find expression in the form of at least some monetary
compensation. 125 Given the passionate feelings many South African
blacks have about their lost land, it is striking that in these provisions
the transitional constitution shows greater solicitude for property than
either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 126 Yet it is also
striking that the ANC was able to prevail over the National Party's
initial preference for compensation at full market value, paid in
cash. 127 Even so, some money will surely be needed, and the money
for such redistribution will have to be provided by decisions of what is
meant to be a government of national unity. This is a government,
moreover, which is likely to be very concerned not to impair investor
confidence with radical economic policies, and anxious as well to avoid
123.
S. Afr. Const. §§ 121-23. Only those who lost their land after 1913 (when a
major piece of South African legislation abridging blacks' ownership rights, the Natives'
Land Act 27 of 1913, was enacted) are eligible for such restitution. Id. §§ 121(2)(a),
121(3). Those who lost their land earlier may become the beneficiaries of other
government programs but apparently will not be permitted to sue the state for
restoration of their land.
Id. §§ 28, 121-23.
124.
Id. §§ 123(2), 28(3).
125.
126.
See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). Neither of these
Covenants includes an explicit protection for "the right to enjoy private property." Louis
Henkin, Introduction to The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1, 11 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Article 17 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, however, does explicitly protect property, though it does not explicitly
guarantee compensation when property is taken by the state. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 17, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948). Professor Henkin argues that "[tihe absence of such a provision [in the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] can hardly be construed as rejecting the existence
in principle of a human right to own property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it."
Henkin, supra, at 21.
127.
Government's Proposals, supra note 116, § 18(3). For the story of the
negotiations on this issue, see Chaskalson, supra note 112.
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the potentially divisive effects of confiscatory levels of taxation (or
expropriation). And this is a government with many competing claims
for its scarce funds.12 8 The government's announced goals for land
distribution are ambitious;129 they will require determination and
ingenuity to achieve. 3 °
The upshot is that both in the field of private discrimination
and in the field of land redistribution, policies aimed at redressing the
legacy of apartheid will be possible (and even likely). But they will also
probably be moderated in ways that reduce the chance that
governmental policy in the first years of the new South Africa will be
perceived by whites, in particular, as an all-out assault on their
interests. These restraints will promote racial harmony in this respect.
What remains to be seen is whether the new government can
pursue policies that will also provide enough tangible gain for black
men and women to avoid another danger to racial harmony, namely a
general perception by blacks that they are still not free in their own
country. I am inclined to think that this goal also can be substantially
achieved. The government's powers, after all, are similar to those of
the United States government, and it is clear enough that when the
United States government wields its authority determinedly, the scope
of that authority is broad indeed. In South Africa, already, the shaping

128.
The new government's fiscal policies during its first months in office have
been strikingly restrained, if not conservative. As one observer has commented,
"Mandela's first post-apartheid budget has tacitly acknowledged the limits of public
intervention; it redirects less than three percent of state spending to programs to uplift
the poor." Paul Taylor, South Africa's "St. Nelson" No "Messiah"to Neighbors, Wash.
Post, Sept. 2, 1994, at Al.
Legislation about to be submitted to Parliament would "entitle about 1.4
129.
million of the estimated 3.5 million people who were forcibly removed [from their land]
to make claims for restitution." Estelle Randall, Bill Cuts the Wait for Land, Weekly Mail
& Guardian (Johannesburg), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1994, at 2 (numbers repunctuated).
A further constraint on the government's redistribution efforts is the
130.
protection given to traditional authorities. See S. Afr. Const. §§ 181-84; id. sched. 4,
princs. XIII & XVII. Like the limits on the redistribution of white-owned land, the
protection of African traditional authorities may be needed in order to reduce the danger
of the resurgence of ethnic politics, in this case African ethnic-traditional politics of the
sort practiced by Inkatha among the Zulu. But chiefs may wield considerable authority
over the allocation of land, and protection of their authority may significantly affect the
actual operation of programs of redistribution. In addition, the more that current rules
of customary law remain in place under the constitution and legislation enacted by the
new parliament or by the provinces, the more that the redistribution of land to African
women may be impeded, for the rights of women to own property under customary law
are extremely circumscribed. See Bennett, supra note 118, at 125-27.
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of programs of land reform, and more broadly of reconstruction and
development, promise substantial changes in the years to come. For
the government to make good on this promise, however, will certainly
require will, and wisdom, and perhaps luck as well.
IV. PROVISIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

The path of compromise and gradual reform that this
constitution charts may prove impossible to follow. Perhaps extremist
whites will attempt rebellion; perhaps Natal will erupt in civil war;
perhaps other Africans sympathetic to the ANC will lose patience with
reforms that seem to leave white power intact. The drafters of this
constitution, many of them opponents or victims of state power in the
past, have attempted both to provide, and to restrain, the kinds of
state power that might be needed to confront such emergencies in the
future. To that end, Section 34 authorizes (subject to a number of
constraints) the declaration of a state of emergency, in which some, but
not all, of the rights guaranteed earlier in the fundamental rights
chapter of the constitution can be suspended. 3 ' In addition, Section
33 authorizes the limitation of any constitutional right, provided that
the limitation is "reasonable" and "justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality," does not "negate
the essential content of the right in question," and (with respect to
some rights, but not all) is "necessary." 132 These provisions are not
misguided, though perhaps particular aspects of them can be criticized;
my point is simply that they provide the new government with the
131.
S. Afr. Const. § 34. I have discussed the issues bearing on the constitutional
handling of emergencies in a post-apartheid South Africa in this journal. Stephen
Ellmann, A Constitution for All Seasons: Providing Against Emergencies in a PostApartheid Constitution, 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 163 (1989). The transitional
constitution seeks to hem in this dangerous power in a variety of ways. The executive
cannot declare a state of emergency for more than 21 days, unless it receives the
approval of two-thirds of the National Assembly to extend the period for up to three
months, and separate approval by the same majority for each subsequent extension of
up to three months. S. Aft. Const. § 34(2). Even when the executive does declare an
emergency and obtains legislative concurrence, certain rights still cannot be suspended.
Id. § 34(5)(c). A number of protections are specifically provided for those detained
without trial under emergency powers. Id. § 34(6). Moreover, courts are empowered "to
enquire into the validity of a declaration of a state of emergency, any extension thereof,
and any action taken, including any regulation enacted, under such declaration," id.
§ 34(3), and can free detainees whose detention they find unnecessary to the restoration
of peace or order. Id. § 34(6)(c).
132.
S. Afr. Const. § 33(1).
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power to breach normally protected rights - as it might have to do, in
order to control racial or ethnic violence.
It is one thing to have this authority, and another to carry it
out. For the latter, the government must first have loyal and capable
security forces - and those forces will be more likely to succeed in
their tasks if they face no opposing forces. I have already mentioned
some of the efforts the new constitution makes to assuage the anxieties
of the military and police forces (and other government employees) for
their jobs and pensions, so as to secure their support for the new order.
In addition, the ANC may hope that the incorporation of former
guerrilla soldiers into the military and the police will enhance those
forces' loyalty further; this incorporation, to some extent provided for
in the constitution, is now under way.13 3 So far, the military in
particular has shown itself prepared to adapt to a post-apartheid
world - South African jets helped celebrate Nelson Mandela's
inauguration, and South African soldiers were deployed effectively at
some important moments in the transition process. But it is not yet
clear just how fully either the military or the police will enter into the
process of reform, and there are certainly signs already that the task
of moving them will not be simple. 34
133.
Id. § 224. The minister of defense, Joe Modise, has announced that 22,000
members ofUmkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's military wing, and 6000 members of the Pan
Africanist Congress' Azanian People's Liberation Army "automatically became members
of the South African National Defence Force," presumably by virtue of this provision.
22,000 MKs in the Forces, This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the South
African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 31-Sept. 5, 1994, at 7 (the
quoted language is from the report and not necessarily from Modise himself). The
projected cost of integrating the old South African Defence Force, the guerrilla armies,
and the armies of the former homelands, as well as downsizing the resultant force
thereafter, is extremely high. One South African newspaper has commented that
"[p]acifying a handful of redundant soldiers will consume a huge chunk of Government
revenues that should be spent improving the quality of life - and hence the prospects
for social stability - of millions of deprived people in urban ghettoes and rural
settlements. We have heard of 'peace at a price,' but this is ridiculous." The Business
Day: 'Peace at a Price," This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the South
African Media (S. Afr. Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 9-15, 1994, at 7.
134.
The new minister of defense, Joe Modise, formerly a senior ANC military
leader, recently took the remarkable step of seeking to enjoin a newspaper's publication
of information about undercover agents of the old regime. Louise Flanagan & Chandra
Gould, What the GeneralsDidn't Tell Modise, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg),
June 17-23, 1994, at 1. The minister of police, Sidney Mafumadi, has just responded to
the same newspaper's request for government files on the police by producing material
so stunningly scanty as to compel the conclusion that the police have hidden or destroyed
extensive information. The Mail Gets Its Police File.... Weekly Mail & Guardian

42

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.26:5

Ensuring that the security forces do not face effective
opposition will also not be entirely easy. The government's position is
certainly enhanced by the absence of any right for citizens to bear
arms, and by the specific indication that the right of assembly is a
"right to assemble and demonstrate with others peacefully and
13 5 In certain respects,
unarmed."
however, the government's
monopoly on force does not seem absolutely ironclad. Private citizens
in South Africa, particularly whites but now many blacks as well, are
well armed, and taking these guns away, especially during 13a period of
tremendously high crime, will be difficult, to say the least.'

(Johannesburg), July 22-28, 1994, at 1.
This newspaper also reported at one point that President Mandela may have
"agreed to cede control of intelligence matters to his deputy, F.W. de Klerk, in an
apparent barter for ANC control of the police and the South African National Defense
Force," despite the danger that the intelligence services "could continue to function in a
partisan manner. Inclined towards the NP [National Party) by tradition, they could
become a powerful weapon in De Klerk's hands in the run-up to the next election."
Stephen Laufer, Tug of War over Intelligence Services, Weekly Mail & Guardian
(Johannesburg), June 24-30, 1994, at 8. More recently, the same newspaper has reported
that de Klerk now is "refus[ing] to relinquish" control over the intelligence services. As
the report points out, President Mandela's authority to divest de Klerk of this
responsibility was constrained by the obligation to distribute the various cabinet
portfolios not only on the basis of numerical proportionality but also "in the spirit
underlying the concept of a government of national unity." Chris Louw, FW's Tussle Over
Intelligence, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Sept. 2-8, 1994, at 3; see S. Afr.
Const. § 88(5). Although Nelson Mandela recently told a reporter that he had "stripped"
de Klerk of his intelligence role, Bill Keller, A Day in the Life of Nelson Mandela: Charm,
Control,a Bit ofAcid, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1994, at Al, de Klerk has held on to at least
some authority, for Mandela has appointed him "to head a cabinet committee overseeing
intelligence services." David Beresford, De Kierk to Head Spy Committee, Guardian
(London), Sept. 15, 1994, at 12.
135.
S. Aft. Const. § 16 (emphasis added).
136.
The founder of the South African Gun Owners' Association claims there are
4,000,000 guns legally in private hands. Stefaans Brdmmer, Critics Open Fire on Gun
Proposal,Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 10-16, 1994, at 8. Most of these
hands are evidently white, as a result of apartheid restrictions on blacks' access to
firearms. One proposal under consideration for addressing the issue of private gun
ownership has been described as a "one person, one gun" rule. Id.
Crime statistics, meanwhile, reflect what everyday anecdotes confirm: South
Africa, even disregarding political violence, is a very dangerous place. The homicide rate
has been estimated at 20,000 per year - roughly the equivalent of 140,000 per year in
the United States. See Keith B. Richburg, S. A,-icans Struggle to Cope With a 'Society
in Stress. Violence Creates a Heavy Mental Health Burden, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1993, at
Al. Apparently the rate of rape in South Africa is comparable to its homicide rate, and
thus, again, much greater than that in the United States. See Howard Witt, S. Africa
Takes on Tone of Wild West, Chi. Trib., Mar. 19, 1990, at 4.
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Nor is the problem solely one of private individuals. The
interim constitution establishes a single South African Police Service,
to function at both national and provincial levels, 137 and this
arrangement will likely ensure that policing in South Africa remains
a much more centralized function than it is in the United States. But
the interim constitution also devolves a portion of authority over the
South African Police Service from the national to the provincial
level. 138 In addition, it calls for the establishment of municipal police
forces, outside the South African Police Service. 139 These steps may
reduce the danger to liberty that the centralized South African police
have so often posed in the past, but by the same token these measures
somewhat limit national authority. Recent news reports of the political
battles between the ANC and Inkatha over control of the
KwaZulu/Natal provincial police ministry suggest the chilling
possibility that provincial police, despite being part of the national
Police Service, may succeed in operating with enough independence to
constitute a limit on the national government's full possession of a
monopoly on force. 140 It is also startling to realize that Section 224,
after declaring that the South African National Defence Force "is
hereby established as the only defence force for the Republic," 41 also
seems to contemplate the establishment of other armed forces under
laws, apparently including
provincial laws, "for the protection of
142
persons or property."
None of this means that there will be any force in South Africa
that can stand against the army; but there may be many people in

137.
See S. Afr. Const. §§ 214-20.
138.
Id. §§ 217-20.
139.
Id. § 221(3).
140.
See Stephen Laufer, Shake up of the SAP Ranks, Weekly Mail & Guardian
(Johannesburg), May 27-June 2, 1994, at 2; Farouk Chothia, IFP Police Post Saga
Continues, Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 3-9, 1994, at 2.
141.
S. Afr. Const. § 224(1). This welcome provision stands for the principle that
provincial military forces, as such, will not be permitted. The possibility of such direct
challenges to the national monopoly on military power was not fanciful. In 1992, the
KwaZulu legislature, firmly under the control of Chief Buthelezi, had proposed a
provincial constitution that would have authorized the then-hypothetical state of
KwaZulu/Natal to make service in its militia compulsory, while prohibiting national
armed forces from entering the state without its approval. Proposed Constitution of the
State of KwaZulu/Natal arts. 98(a), 67(b). I discuss these and other provisions of this
proposed constitution in Stephen Ellmann, Federalism Awry: The KwaZulu/Natal
Constitution, 9 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 165 (1993).
142.
S. Afr. Const. § 224(3).

44

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.26:5

South Africa who can operate where the army is absent, or when the
army proves reluctant to act. The real power of the new government
to respond to ethnic (or other) violence with force, then, is less than its
power on paper. Perhaps in the end it is desirable for the national
government not to have an absolute monopoly on force. Certainly this
14
was the theory of the framers of the United States Constitution. 1
But these constraints underline the importance of the government's
finding ways to address ethnic division short of force - for when the
use of guns becomes the only solution, it may prove not only a horrible
but also an ineffectual answer.
V. CONCLUSION

With great courage and hope, and also out of a mutual
recognition that the alternatives were even more problematic, black
and white South Africans have chosen to adopt an interim constitution
which seeks, through its provisions on structure, on rights and on
sheer force, to handle the problems of racial and ethnic division within
the framework of a single, democratic state. This decision involved
major compromises on all sides, and imposes significant constraints on
the new government that has now taken office. But both strategic
calculation and moral principle, I think, teach that this decision was
a fundamentally wise one for the ANC (and an enlightened one for the
white government). The uneasy balance crafted by the interim
constitution may prove problematic, but it represents a remarkable,
and admirable, effort to invent a democratic nation in the face of a
heritage of centuries of injustice. This is not the Freedom Charter the dramatic 1955 expression of the aspirations of the African National
Congress and its allies in the struggle against apartheid - but it is a
first draft of a Freedom Constitution.

143.
James Madison, one of the principal authors of the United States
Constitution, maintained that the military power of the states' militias would far exceed
that of any possible "regular army" of the national government. The Federalist No. 46,
at 298-300 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Furthermore, according to Prof.

Tribe, "[tihe congressional debates... indicate that the central concern of the second
amendment's framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the state militia as
would permit the establishment of a standing national army and the consequent
destruction of local autonomy." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 299 n.6
(2d ed. 1988). Today, however, federal authority over the state militias is virtually
plenary. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990).

